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When the Supreme Court decision in the Repeta case' was handed down on
March 8, 1989, I was in West Berlin. I came back to Tokyo on the final day of
March. At the beginning of April, I was busy reading letters, newspapers, and
other documents that had reached me during my absence. Among the pile of
publications, I noticed a small newsletter, a monthly paper of the Japan Civil
Liberties Union. The headline caught my eyes. It read something like this:
"The Supreme Court liberalized taking notes in the courtroom." I was very
surprised at first, but a few seconds later I began to think that this was a bad
joke. I thought that this publication was a special April Fool's issue; however,
we do not have the American custom of celebrating April Fool's Day. I
certainly had not expected the Supreme Court to revise the decision of the
lower court. I thought it would have been rather natural for the Court to rely
on judges' discretionary disciplinary powers at the expense of the people's
right to know. This was a rather shocking decision, which I did not expect
from the otherwise restrained Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held that, in spite of a judge's wide discretionary
powers, the presiding judge is not allowed to prohibit those in attendance
from taking notes, irrespective of the context or type of case. As I pointed out
in my paper for this symposium, 2 the Supreme Court characteristically
decided the case almost totally on the basis of the scope of the judge's
discretionary powers. Although the Court spoke of the spirit of the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression and of the right to gather
information, the main emphasis of the decision was on the scope of the
judge's discretionary powers. It seems to me, however, that the issue
presented here was related to a citizen's right to attend, inspect, and record
court proceedings. As such, it was very similar to the type of case that the
United States Supreme Court confronted in the Richmond Newspapers case 3
in 1980.
In that case, the American Supreme Court dealt with the issue at the
constitutional level without the slightest hesitation. The Court treated the
issue as a problem concerning first amendment rights. There is a great
contrast between the approaches of the two Supreme Courts. Evidently, the
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Japanese Supreme Court would not like to make any affirmative statements
about the people's right to know because, I submit, once open to that
direction, constitutional claims would extend from the right to take notes in
the courtroom to the right of access to government records, and even to the
right to inspect governmental institutions, such as prisons and military bases.
For better or worse, the Japanese Court is more cautious in this respect than
the American courts.
I would also like to discuss some problems surrounding penal institutions
or detention settlements. In Japan there has been no serious discussion about
what Americans call "prisoners' rights." 4 The Japanese seem to take it for
granted that those who are responsible for the maintenance of an institution
such as a prison have wide discretionary disciplinary powers; prisoners shall
be subject to such powers almost absolutely. Thus, to the Japanese, speaking
about the constitutional rights of prisoners is nonsensical.
The next case that I would like to touch on concerns both the rights of
prisoners and the citizens' right to know. If one wants to visit detainees in the
Tokyo detention center, one has to apply for permission to enter. On the
application form, one must show the purpose of the visit, one's status, and
one's connection with the detainee. If one is a relative or a friend, no serious
problem will occur. However, if a journalist applies and the purpose of the
visit is to interview a detainee, the journalist will encounter difficulty in seeing
the detainee.
Recently, a few journalists and detainees sued the detention center over its
refusal of access to the journalists. This lawsuit is now pending in the Tokyo
District Court. Since the lawsuit, the rule has been relaxed, and some
journalists are permitted entrance. This kind of discrimination against
journalists would rarely occur in the United States, where journalists seem to
be regarded as representatives of the community and have little difficulty in
gaining access to such a governmental institution.
The American flag burning case, Texas v. Johnson,5 also interests me very
much. Although we do not have a flag desecration statute that protects the
national flag of Japan, we do have one provision in our criminal code6 similar
to state and federal statutes on flag desecration in the United States. This
criminal code provision declares that persons who desecrate national flags
and symbols of foreign countries shall be prosecuted as criminals. One
incident took place over the desecration of the Chinese flag, but it was purely
political in nature. In recent years, there have been no cases.
However, one case is now pending in the Okinawa District Court which
involves an activity similar to flag desecration. In October 1987, the annual
National Athletic Meet was held in Okinawa. Yumitan Village was to be the
site of the softball games. One of the most horrible battles had been fought in
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the village during the last stage of World War II, and many civilians had been
killed there. The Hinomaru flag symbolized the residents' bad memory of the
battle. Thus, it was very controversial whether the Hinomaru flag would be
raised during the opening ceremony for the games. Despite the controversy
and public protests against the plan of hanging the Hinomaru flag, it was
hoisted at the central, highest pole on the morning of October 26, 1987, at
the opening ceremony. A citizen of the village pulled down the flag and
burned it. He was arrested, and after twenty-five days of police detention he
was indicted for destroying another person's property7 and for two other
minor charges (invasion of another person's building8 and obstruction of
another person's business performance 9 ). I do not know whether the
defendant made a freedom of expression argument in his defense.
Theoretically speaking, this case concerns destruction of property, not flag
desecration. We do not have a law that designates the Hinomaru flag as a
national flag. I wonder if in this case the constitutional arguments for
freedom of expression could prevail.
I mentioned something about confrontational bills in my own paper for
this symposium.10 Legislation concerning national flags, national anthems,
and other national symbols constitute, no doubt, confrontational bills. As
such, it is very difficult to gain sufficient popular support for such legislation
to be passed by the Diet. Thus, the Japanese Supreme Court is fortunate
enough to remain free from the involvement of vexing constitutional issues
arising from such controversial legislation as its American counterpart
confronted in Texas v. Johnson. 1 1
7. Id. art. 261.
8. Id. art. 130.
9. Id. art. 234.
10. See Okudaira, supra note 2.
11. 109 S. Ct. 2533.
COMMENT

